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ABSTRACT
Almost two decades have passed since Dutch employers, unions and the govern-
ment, in their struggle against unemployment, agreed on a policy to increase labour
market flexibility. Over the years the share of flexible jobs in the Netherlands has
gradually increased to around ten percent. According to some parties the intro-
duction of more labour market flexibility would lead to more inequality and a divi-
sion in the labour market between workers with permanent employment and an
underclass of women, immigrant workers and poorly educated workers with tem-
porary contracts.The Dutch government has always claimed that a special set of
legal rules regarding labour market flexibility would prevent the development of
such an underclass. In this article three questions are addressed:Who has a flexi-
ble labour contract and who is in permanent employment? What is the pattern of
transition to permanent contracts? What are the consequences for wage rates for
those on permanent or flexible contracts respectively? The answers to these ques-
tions are provided using panel data for the period 1986–96.The results show that
labour market flexibility has been introduced into the Dutch labour market with-
out detrimental consequences for specific groups of workers.
KEY WORDS:
contracts / flexibility / labour market / labour mobility / segmented labour markets
/ transitions 
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1 Introduction
uring the 1990s, the ‘Dutch’ model attracted a great deal of attention from
both economists and policy-makers all over the world. The Dutch Prime
Minister, Wim Kok, was given the opportunity to explain the successes of
this model to the then President of the United States, Bill Clinton, while the
model inspired both the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and his German
counterpart, Gerhard Schröder, in the reshaping of their labour market policies.
Even though it is difficult, from a historical perspective, to identify one specific
moment or event that marks the introduction of the Dutch model, many
researchers consider the Wassenaar Agreement of 1982 to be a landmark in the
transformation of the Dutch economy, and more particularly, of the Dutch
labour market (see e.g. Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). The Wassenaar Agreement
was the result of consultations between Dutch employers and trade unions and
was supported by the Dutch government. The objective of these consultations
was to develop a policy to bring to a halt the rapid increase in unemployment
that was threatening the Dutch economy at the time. The main terms of the
agreement included moderate wage increases (with overall productivity growth
as the main guideline), more room for part-time jobs in order to allow for a cer-
tain redistribution of jobs among workers and the unemployed, and more
labour market flexibility. The government was expected to help increase this
flexibility with measures such as liberalization of the rather strict rules on hiring
and firing, the rigid laws on working hours and the opening hours of shops.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s several measures were taken to allow for
more flexible labour contracts and gradually flexible workers became an
accepted phenomenon in the Netherlands (see also Teulings and Hartog, 1998).
With more than a decade of experience, and bearing in mind the success of
the Dutch consensus model, the question arises as to whether the increased
labour market flexibility has resulted exclusively in winners, or whether the suc-
cesses have left some workers, or groups of workers, empty-handed. This arti-
cle tries to answer this question by using the successive waves of a survey
carried out every two years by the Netherlands Organization of Strategic
Labour Market Research (OSA). We had access to the data between 1986 and
1996 (six waves).
Labour market flexibility may take different forms (Atkinson, 1984). In
this article the focus of attention will be on numerical flexibility in terms of flex-
ible labour contracts. An important reason for this is that the government’s
efforts to increase labour market flexibility concentrated mainly on this form.
Moreover, numerical flexibility can be observed and recorded easily.
Introducing (internal) functional flexibility often takes quite some time. It is,
therefore, more difficult to study. As far as flexibility of pay is concerned, this
hardly seems to be an issue in the Netherlands. Trade union representatives
have been successful in preventing the issue of more flexibility of basic wages
from becoming an issue in negotiations with employers. One reason for this
may be that since the conclusion of the Wassenaar Agreement these basic wages
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have been moderated considerably anyway, so employers have not pressed for
more flexibility in this respect. Instead, employers have concentrated on flexible
fringe benefits, which are supplementary to the guaranteed basic wage.
Another form of flexibility is the share of part-time workers in the labour
market. There is no doubt about the fact that the Netherlands is the part-time
work champion of the European Union (Fagan et al., 1995; Plantenga, 1995).
Part-time jobs in the Netherlands, however, do not necessarily have the charac-
teristics typical of flexible jobs and can, contrary to the situation in several
other EU countries and the United States, certainly not be considered as
marginal labour (see also Meulders et al., 1994). All part-timers in the
Netherlands have been entitled to the minimum hourly wage since 1993. Many
part-time jobs are permanent jobs and their incumbents are protected against
unfair dismissal in the same way as full-time workers. In other words, part-time
work in the Netherlands is not the same as flex work, especially not from the
individual part-time worker’s point of view. It does, however, contribute greatly
to the flexibility of the Dutch labour market.
The form of numerical flexibility studied in this article is that of flexible
labour contracts. We address three questions. The first question looks at who
has flexible labour contracts. Are some (groups of) workers more likely to be
employed on a flexible basis than others? Next, we study to what extent work-
ing on a flexible contract is a permanent or a temporary phenomenon when we
look at it from an individual’s point of view. Is it true that ‘once flexible’ implies
‘always flexible’ or do workers move from flexible to permanent jobs? The last
question addresses the consequences of flexible labour contracts in terms of
wages. Do flexible workers receive lower wages than those with permanent con-
tracts?
Section 2 gives a brief description of flexible labour contracts in the
Netherlands. Next, section 3 gives a concise overview of a number of major
theoretical insights with regard to labour market flexibility. At the end of this
overview, hypotheses are put forward dealing with the question of whether flex-
ibility has created ‘winners’ and/or ‘losers’. After a description of the data in
section 4, sections 5 and 6 give the results of the empirical analyses with respect
to the probability of flexible labour contracts, transition rates and wages. The
main conclusions are summarized and policy issues addressed in the final sec-
tion.
2 Flexible labour contracts in the Netherlands
Dutch census data define flexible labour contracts as contracts restricted in time
– that is less than one year – and/or as contracts without a fixed number of
working hours. Employees with short-term contracts, on-call contracts, substi-
tute workers and temporary workers can, therefore, all be defined as flexible
workers. The share of flexible workers in the Netherlands according to this
definition was 10.3 percent in 1998. This share had been increasing until the
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middle of the 1990s (in 1992 is was 7.6 %) and has remained stable since then.
Female workers have flexible labour contracts more often than male workers:
14.5 percent for women and 7.5 percent for men in 1998. Other relevant pre-
dictors for flexible contracts prove to be age and level of education (Fouarge et
al., 1999). Older workers have permanent jobs more often than younger work-
ers. The relationship between level of education and the probability of being
permanently employed is less linear. Both workers with little education and
workers who have undergone higher education have flexible contracts more
often than workers with an intermediate level of education. Ethnicity is relevant
as well. Immigrants from Turkey and Morocco work in flexible jobs more often
than indigenous workers (SCP, 1999). In addition, working in part-time jobs
also increases the probability of having a flexible contract (CBS, 1999).
The catering industry is the most flexible sector of the Dutch economy.
Nearly 33 percent of the female employees and almost 26 percent of the male
employees in this industry have a flexible contract. The lowest percentages are
found in public administration. Only 3.2 percent of the male workers in this
sector have a flexible job; for female workers the percentage is higher: 7.6 per-
cent of female employees in public administration have flexible contracts (CBS,
1999).
3 Theoretical notions with respect to the flexibility of
labour
From a theoretical perspective, economics, sociology and managerial theory
have brought forward different hypotheses with respect to the range and scope
of flexibility. The main ideas concerning the question of which tasks, processes
and activities in a company are eligible for ‘flexibilization’, which workers are
offered flexible contracts and what consequences may follow in terms of their
labour market positions and wages are discussed in this section. These theoret-
ical insights are subsequently used as a framework for the empirical analyses.
Flexibility and the demand side of the labour market
Flexibility on the demand side of the labour market basically refers to the ques-
tion of for what type of jobs and tasks, for what occupations and by what
industries are flexible jobs offered. At a theoretical level this question can be
answered easily: flexibility becomes an issue when activities involve unstable
and fluctuating conditions of demand by consumers or intermediary companies
(in the case of goods that are not distributed to consumers directly).
Furthermore, it must not be possible to produce goods on a large scale in order
to stock them. As a consequence, the service industry’s demand for flexible
labour is substantially greater than that of manufacturing. The agricultural sec-
tor, where nature has a big hand in the fluctuation in the supply of work, has
always had a relatively large share of flexible labour, too.
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When it comes to numerical flexibility, there seem to be strong links to the
position of a job in the organization. For strategic and so-called core-jobs and
activities, most organizations prefer a regular complement of labour.
Managerial and executive jobs are usually included in this category. Positions
which involve dealing with confidential or strategic organization-related infor-
mation are also usually permanently staffed. Organizations usually opt for a
mixture of permanent and flexible staff that ensures that the continuity of the
organization is sufficiently guaranteed. The permanent staff can be considered
as the backbone of the organization. In many cases these members of staff are
responsible for the work climate in the organization, as well as the organiza-
tion’s external image and reputation (Pinfield, 1995).
The extent to which it is possible and desirable to call in flexible workers
also depends on the degree of specialization of the activities involved (Black and
Lynch, 1996). If specialized knowledge and skills are not required and training
periods are short, employing additional workers on a short-term basis, e.g.
from a temporary employment agency, does not constitute a problem. Besides,
it is important that the potential damage risk of a job is limited: if the damage
following a mistake by an inexperienced worker could be considerable, an orga-
nization will prefer to have the task performed by an experienced member of
staff, even though this may involve some delay, instead of hiring an inexperi-
enced flexible worker.
As has been shown in the past decade, there is a strong connection between
numerical flexibility and the business cycle. When the economy is in an upswing
and economic activity is increasing, organizations hesitate to employ new staff
on a permanent basis immediately. They may initially opt for temporary work-
ers and short-term contracts instead. Only if the increased demand persists, will
organizations expand their permanent staff. When the economy is declining and
activity rates drop, flexible workers will be the first to face the loss of their jobs.
Only if reduced activity rates are followed by a real and lasting economic reces-
sion, do organizations have to settle for the inevitable and make permanent
staff redundant too. The reluctance to dismiss this category of personnel can be
explained by the relatively high cost of hiring and firing and the investments
made with respect to training (Polachek and Siebert, 1993).
The argument that temporary employment precedes permanent employ-
ment can also be used at the industry level. New, growing industries offer flex-
ible jobs more often than old industries that are in decline. The staff of growing
industries is still expanding and ideas regarding who is, and who is not, going
to be part of the core of the organization have not yet fully developed. In declin-
ing industries the staff will be reduced to the very minimum and there will be
little demand for flexible workers.
Flexibility and the supply side of the labour market
Decision making with respect to labour supply cannot be separated from many
other ‘personal’ decisions. Many of these decisions are taken in the framework
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of a household or family, such as the decision regarding where to find a place
to live, whether to take out a mortgage, or to start a relationship with someone,
etc. (see Mertens et al., 1998). In many cases one decision affects other deci-
sions too, commitments have been made and must be honoured, and sooner or
later the decision regarding the number of hours supplied in the labour market
is no longer a free choice. Given the existing obligations and commitments,
many workers prefer permanent and stable employment (Ester and Vinken,
2001). Such labour contracts not only create security with respect to current
rights and obligations, they also offer a clear perspective of the future (for
instance with respect to retirement pensions). This is why workers who want to
transfer from one job to another also prefer the transfer from one long-term
labour contract to another.
Does this imply that flexible jobs are only suitable for workers without
obligations or for risk takers, who set little store on security? When we look,
for instance, at groups such as students, who have to pay their tuition fees and
who turn their backs on the labour market as soon as they have earned enough
money, we see a group that fits into this category quite well. To a lesser extent
this also holds for newcomers in the labour market. In many cases they are still
looking around and find it convenient to explore the labour market and their
own opportunities through a series of temporary jobs, without feeling restricted
to or tempted by permanent jobs.
Another category includes those individuals who are not deliberately tak-
ing risks but who are willing to take a chance (see also Sennett, 1998). This cat-
egory includes, for instance, highly-educated professionals who can be hired for
specialist jobs on a temporary basis, and who charge high fees allowing them,
for example, to take a rest on a luxurious holiday afterwards. After some time
a new client with a new, rewarding assignment will turn up and the wheel starts
spinning again.
Flexibility and the match between supply and demand
Eventually, it is the match between supply and demand in the labour market
which will determine what workers will take on flexible jobs and what jobs will
be done by flexible workers. Different types of market forces affect the match
between supply and demand in the labour market. Economic and sociological
theorists have advanced hypotheses with respect to this match. Earlier research
(Jaspers et al., 1989) proved that there are differences in the potential of work-
ers to realize their preferences in the labour market. Men have better opportu-
nities than women, and indigenous workers are in a better position to do so
than immigrant workers. A similar hypothesis can be formulated with respect
to more highly educated workers and/or more experienced workers compared
to less highly educated and/or less experienced workers. Becker’s theory of dis-
crimination (1957) indicates that there is ‘a taste for discrimination’ which
explains employers’ preferential treatment of one group compared with
another. The theory on ‘statistical discrimination’ (Phelps, 1972) refers to the
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alleged differences in productivity among workers. Thurow (1975), in his ‘job
competition’ theory, emphasized the importance of the ‘trainability’ of workers
and the relevance of queues for the limited ‘opening slots’ in an organization,
for instance, vacancies which are filled by way of external recruitment. All these
theories have in common that they explain why some workers have better
chances of filling a certain vacancy than others.
Taking into account what has been said before and what we know from the
literature, for permanent employment employers can be expected to select: men,
experienced workers, and workers in whom they have made considerable
investments.
When trying to fill vacancies for flexible jobs, employers are inclined to
broaden their search to: women, minority and foreign workers, and workers
with little human capital.
In industries or labour market segments where labour is scarce, workers
will find it easier to insist on long-term labour contracts than in segments where
employment is scarce.
The consequences for a worker’s career and the development of his or her
income are basically the same. Just as permanent employment is often a neces-
sary condition for participating in company-specific training, it is also the key
to other terms of employment, such as fringe benefits, participation in a pension
scheme, etc. These terms of employment almost always operate as an instru-
ment perpetuating the bond between the worker and the employer. In other
words, such arrangements are exclusively intended for workers with whom the
employer indeed wants this kind of bond.
4 Data and analyses
Data
Data from the Netherlands’ Organization of Strategic Labour Market Research
(OSA) Labour Supply Panel were used for the analyses. The panel is a face-to-
face biannual panel survey among a representative sample of about 2000 house-
holds. These are sampled from the total number of households in the
Netherlands. Each member of these households between the ages of 16 and 65
years, who is not in daytime education, is interviewed. The questions are
directed at the employment situation of the respondents and their labour mar-
ket behaviour. 
Since it is a panel survey (which started in 1985), subsequent surveys have
taken place (every two years, starting in 1986). Each new wave of the sample is
supplemented with new households due to dropout. The panel nature of the sur-
vey makes it particularly useful for studying transition rates between different
forms of contracts and the consequences of flexible labour contracts over time. 
Unfortunately, dropouts from the panel reduce the possibility of following
the whole group over a long period. Between two successive waves of the panel,
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the percentage of respondents present in both waves varies from 65 to 70
(Kunnen et al., 1997). Moreover, the dropout may be selective: employees with
flexible contracts may drop out more often than employees in permanent
employment. In spite of these limitations, the OSA panel is the most suitable
data set available in the Netherlands for our purposes. 
We analysed data from 1986 until 1996 (six waves). This means we were
able to look into developments regarding flexible contracts over a ten-year
period. The sample is representative for the Dutch population with respect to
age, gender and education. It is not representative with respect to labour mar-
ket position: self-employed and unemployed persons are under represented.
However, since our analyses are directed exclusively at employees, this does not
seem to be a problem.
Operationalizations and analyses
Firstly, we wanted to analyse the probability of the occurrence of permanent
versus flexible labour contracts. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous
(whether or not flexible contracts are involved) logistic regression analysis is the
most appropriate technique. Employees are divided into two groups: one group
with permanent employment and one group with flexible contracts. This latter
group includes employees with fixed-term contracts, temporary workers and
on-call workers.
Based on the theory and the availability of data, the following independent
variables are used in the analysis: gender, ethnicity,1 age, education, labour mar-
ket position two years earlier, working in a management position, training
period for the job, whether the company offers education or not, and the indus-
try the organization belongs to. The labour market position two years earlier is
an indicator of the experience of the employees. Besides, employers may use this
information to decide on the type of contract to offer to an employee. We used
dummy variables: unemployed or employed two years earlier. The reference cat-
egory is the group which did not participate in the labour market (neither
employed, nor looking for a job). With respect to the industry we distinguish
between the main sectors used in statistics for the Netherlands. 
Whether a company offers education is an indicator of how much employ-
ers are willing to invest in their employees. Employers will expect returns from
these investments. By offering permanent employment, they can exert more
influence on these returns. Another indicator is the training period for the job;
the longer it is, the more an employer invests in an employee and the sooner he
will offer a long-term labour contract. As each separate wave of the panel con-
tains only a limited number of immigrant workers we pooled the different
waves of our data. The use of this pooled data set also gave us the opportunity
to include two additional variables: the unemployment rate for the year of each
wave, indicating the tightness of the labour market and the degree to which
workers could ‘demand’ a permanent contract or not, and the length of the
period elapsed since the Wassenaar Agreement of 1982, indicating the extent to
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which the Dutch economy was getting ‘used to’ different forms of labour mar-
ket flexibility.
The next step in our analyses tries to answer the question of which cate-
gories of workers are more likely to gain permanent employment than others
after having been on a flexible contract. To analyse these probabilities we esti-
mated a logistic regression, using the same explanatory variables as in our pre-
vious analysis. For this estimation we selected workers who were on a flexible
contract in one wave of the panel and worked on a flexible contract again or
had gained a permanent contract in the next wave. Once again, due to the small
sample size, we pooled these selected workers from the different waves for the
analyses.
The impact of flexible labour contracts on income was examined by way of
analysing the wage rate of employees. For 1996, wage rates were estimated
using OLS regression analysis. We used the gross wage rate as a dependent vari-
able. A log-linear transformation was applied to the wage rate. Consequently
by approximation the coefficients can be interpreted as changes in terms of per-
centage of wages due to a unit change in the independent variable. Independent
variables are based on the theoretical model as well as on the availability of
data. The variables are: a permanent contract (1 = yes), two dummy variables
for working part-time; less than 20 hours per week (1 = yes), and working 20
to 32 hours per week (1 = yes), age, level of education, industry, and size of
organization for which two dummy variables were used (50–200 employees;
more than 200 employees).
5 Who has a flexible labour contract?
Table 1 contains the results of the logistic regression explaining the probability
of having a long-term labour contract versus a flexible contract during the
period 1986–96. Table 1 shows that the labour market position two years ear-
lier is the most important factor in explaining the probability of having a per-
manent contract. Employees who were employed two years earlier have a
permanent contract more often. The significance of having been employed
before is an indicator that employers will try to gain the commitment of
experienced employees and/or that experienced employees will demand a long-
term contract when they are looking for another job. The positive effects of
having a job that requires a three-month, or longer, training period and having
a managerial job point in the same direction: these are the core workers that are
the backbone of the company. The opposite holds for jobs that require hardly
any training (less than two days): workers on these jobs are easily dispensable.
Employees working in organizations offering training and educational
facilities have permanent contracts more often than employees working in orga-
nizations that do not offer such facilities. This once again confirms the idea pre-
sented in the theoretical section of this article that the more company-specific
human capital is involved in production, the bigger the incentive for employers
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to use permanent contracts as an instrument to safeguard their investments in
worker training.
Male employees have a long-term labour contract more often than female
employees. The effect of being born outside the Netherlands on having a per-
manent job is (just) not significant. However, the tendency of the effect is as
expected: persons born in the Netherlands have a greater chance of having a
permanent contract. The effects of age conform with our theoretical expecta-
tions and show quite a neat pattern: the probability of winning a permanent job
increases gradually with age, reaching its maximum for workers over 45 years
of age. 
The effects of educational level on having a permanent contract are more
puzzling; the only significant – negative – effect found was for workers with a
university degree: they have a significantly lower chance of holding a permanent
job. One possible explanation refers to the argument discussed in our theoreti-
cal section, that workers with university training do not ‘need’ or ‘want’ per-
manent jobs: they ‘hop’ from one financially attractive opportunity to another.
For another possible explanation we may point to the economic recession dur-
ing the late 1980s and early 1990s. This hit the sectors where workers with uni-
versity training are over represented relatively hard. Due to cuts in budgets,
government agencies and educational institutions, particularly universities,
hardly employed any permanent staff for several years. To some extent this pic-
ture is reflected in the effects of the sector in which the employee works, though
no significant effect was found in any sector.
In addition to what was said about cuts in the government budget, in a
broader sense it may be argued that our basic hypotheses with respect to the
effect of working in a specific branch or sector, are being undermined by busi-
ness cycle effects. After severe budget cuts the number of civil servants declined
considerably during the 1980s. As a consequence, increasing public sector activ-
ity in the 1990s forced all kinds of government agencies to hire a substantial
number of temporary workers. A similar argument may be applied to the bank-
ing industry. After a series of mergers during the 1980s and large scale redun-
dancies among permanent workers, organizations had become so ‘lean’ that
every small increase in production had to be met by an increase in temporary
employees.
Both variables included in the analysis to take account of the historical
dimension of the issue of labour market flexibility show what is to be expected:
that there is an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and the
probability of having a permanent contract. This is in line with the theoretical
notion that if there is excess supply in the labour market, workers have to lower
their demands and settle for a temporary contract sooner, while in case of
excess demand, employers use permanent contracts as a means of competing for
scarce workers. The relatively small, but significant effect of the length of the
period that has elapsed since 1982 (the year of the Wassenaar Agreement on –
among other things – increasing labour market flexibility in the Netherlands)
shows that flexible labour contracts gained ground over time. The social
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Table 1 Results of logistic regression analyses to explain the probability of having a permanent
contract versus a temporary contract; pooled data for the Netherlands, 1986–96
Explanatory variables Coefficients (t-values)
Gender (1 = male) 0.44** 5.55
Ethnicityb (1 = reported to be born outside the Netherlands) –0.54 –1.76
Age
n < 25 years –0.59** –4.62
n 25–35 years –0.41** –3.57
n 35–45 years –0.40** –3.41
n 45–55 yearsa
n > 55 years –0.06 –0.29
Education
n Primary school 0.22 1.63
n Lower general and vocational training 0.14 1.65
n Intermediate general and vocational traininga
n Higher vocational training –0.12 –0.98
n University –0.73•• –3.87
n Unknown 0.62 1.70
Unemployed two years beforeb –0.29* –2.11
Employed two years beforeb 1.68** 18.52
Managerial positionb 0.32** 3.87
Training period of job
n < 2 days –0.69** –7.77
n 3 days–3 monthsa
n > 3 months 0.87** 9.97
Company offers educationb 0.30** 4.13
Sector
n Manufacturinga
n Construction –0.25 –1.46
n Wholesale, retail trade and hotels and restaurants 0.02 0.19
n Transport, storage and communication 0.14 0.76
n Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities –0.07 –0.53
n Public administration –0.20 –1.24
n Education –0.14 –0.83
n Health and social work; other community services 0.03 0.24
Number of years since Wassenaar agreement –0.05** –4.39
Unemployment rate –0.15** –3.91
Constant 2.49** 6.73
–2 Log Likelihood 6255.453
N 15,385
* significant at p < 0.05; ** significant at p < 0.01
a reference
b dummy-variable (1 if characteristic applies); for 1986 the period for the variables unemployed and employed is
one instead of two years before
Source: Calculations based on OSA Labour supply panel 1986–96
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partners (the trade unions and employers’ organizations) may conclude from
this analysis that their mutual agreement, supported by the government, has
indeed been successful in making the Dutch labour market more flexible.
Others might argue that market forces that urged social partners to agree on
more labour market flexibility remained active over the course of time. No mat-
ter what interpretation prevails, the outcomes of the analysis clearly show an
increasing trend towards more flexible labour contracts over time.
6 Consequences of flexible labour contracts
Transition rates
Does the fact that individuals have flexible contracts imply that they will go on
working in flexible contracts? Do they eventually get permanent positions or do
they become unemployed? These questions can be answered by way of calcu-
lating transition rates for labour market positions. Table 2 shows the two-
yearly transition rates from flexible contracts to other positions inside or
outside the labour market for the period 1986–96. On average, the probability
of gaining a permanent contract after having been on a temporary one decreases
over time from about sixty percent to somewhat over 40, while the probability
of staying on a temporary contract increases in a similar way. The change in the
percentage of former temporary workers making the transition into self-
employment may reflect the state of the business cycle and the opportunities
open to individuals for gaining access to new markets. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the numbers of workers with contracts other than permanent ones are
relatively small. So, the percentages must be interpreted with some caution.
The next question we try to answer is whether there are some groups of
workers who stand a better chance than others of making the transition from a
temporary to a permanent contract. Those opposed to the trend towards more
labour market flexibility have been warning against increasing dichotomy
among workers. In their view ‘once flexible’ would result in ‘always flexible’,
with flexible workers constituting a new kind of underclass as described by dual
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Table 2 Two-yearly transition rates from flexible contracts; data for the Netherlands, 1986–96
Position after two years
Temporary Permanent Temporary Self- Un- Not
contract in: contract contract employed employed participating Total
1986 48.3 25.3 4.4 9.9 12.1 100
1988 60.7 22.2 2.6 7.7 6.8 100
1990 54.6 32.4 2.8 5.6 4.6 100
1992 49.3 31.6 2.9 8.1 8.1 100
1994 43.2 32.8 3.2 11.2 9.6 100
Source: Calculations based on OSA Labour supply panel 1986–96
WES 026423 Remery  5/9/2002  3:47 pm  Page 488
labour market theory (see Cain, 1976). The Dutch government, however, has
always claimed that legal measures, especially the Law on Flexibility and
Security, accompanying the introduction of more labour market flexibility
would prevent such a dichotomy among workers. Logistic regression analysis
explaining the probability of the transition from a temporary contract to a per-
manent one on pooled data for the period 1986–96 shows some remarkable
results (see table 3). None of the personal characteristics, or the characteristics
of the job one holds, has any significant influence on this probability. Even
though one could argue that the number of cases for this analysis is perhaps too
small (N = 481) for any definite conclusions, the outcomes lend more support
to the government’s claim of equal chances for all workers than to the oppo-
nents’ claim that the trend towards more flexibility results in a labour market
dichotomy. If there had been a strong and irrefutable tendency to deny female
or immigrant workers the transition to a permanent contract, some of that ten-
dency would have been reflected in our analysis.
How do we then account for the difference between the outcomes of this
transition analysis and the analysis, presented earlier, of the probability of hav-
ing a permanent versus a temporary job? If there is no difference in the flow
from temporary to permanent contracts between the different categories of
workers, whereas some categories of workers do indeed have a higher proba-
bility of having a permanent contract, logically there is no other possibility than
to reduce these different probabilities to differences between workers entering
the labour market. There is some case-based evidence that women entering the
labour market hold more flexible jobs than male starters.2 We do know, how-
ever, from Phelps’ theory on statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972), that offer-
ing less favourable terms of employment to workers is an often used strategy if
the employer is not sure about workers’ future productivity. Offering temporary
contracts to women, immigrant workers and young workers entering the labour
market is, then, a way of reducing the risk of selecting the ‘wrong’ worker for
permanent employment (Schippers and Siegers, 1994). Only after they have
proven themselves to be devoted and suitable workers do they gain access to
permanent employment.
Consequences of flexible jobs for wages
The consequences of flexible jobs on the worker’s income have been examined
by analysing the impact of flexible contracts on wages. Having a permanent
labour contract appears to be more profitable than having a flexible contract.
However, the average gross wages of employees with a flexible contract have
increased more than the average wages of employees with permanent contracts.
In 1988, employees with flexible contracts earned less than three quarters of the
amount that permanent employees earned; in 1996 this figure was 80.8 percent.
These developments suggest that the introduction of legal arrangements, which
were enforced during the intervening years to protect the labour market posi-
tion of flexible workers, were effective.
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Table 3 Results of logistic regression analyses to explain the probability of the transition from a
temporary contract into a permanent contract; pooled data for the Netherlands, 1986–96
Explanatory variables Coefficients (t-values)
Gender (1 = male) 0.19 0.80
Ethnicityb (1 = reported to be born outside the Netherlands) 0.24 0.27
Age
n < 25 years 0.47 1.30
n 25–35 years 0.06 0.19
n 35–45 years 0.45 1.39
n 45–55 yearsa
n > 55 years –0.55 –0.88
Education
n Primary school 0.23 0.57
n Lower general and vocational training 0.12 0.49
n Intermediate general and vocational traininga
n Higher vocational training 0.52 1.43
n University –0.34 –0.75
n Unknown 0.69 0.59
Unemployed two years beforeb,c –0.02 –0.04
Employed two years beforeb,c 0.40 1.59
Managerial positionb –0.16 –0.45
Training period of job
n < 2 days –0.04 –0.18
n 3 days–3 monthsa
n > 3 months 0.11 0.42
Company offers educationb –0.09 –0.41
Sector
n Manufacturinga
n Construction –0.33 –0.69
n Wholesale, retail trade and hotels and restaurants 0.01 0.03
n Transport, storage and communication 0.03 0.06
n Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities –0.36 –0.91
n Public administration –0.15 –0.29
n Education –0.19 –0.40
n Health and social work; other community services –0.14 –0.36
Number of years since Wassenaar agreement –0.07 –1.44
Unemployment rate 0.01 0.11
Constant 0.62 0.63
–2 Log Likelihood 599.409
N 481
* significant at p < 0.05; ** significant at p < 0.01
a reference
b dummy-variable (1 if characteristic applies); for 1986 the period for the variables unemployed and employed is
one instead of two years before
c If transitions relate to changes between t0 and t1, this variable refers to t–1
Source: Calculations based on OSA Labour supply panel 1986–96
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In order to establish the relative impact of working on a permanent or
flexible contract, respectively, compared to the impact of other variables
explaining the wage rate, we performed some additional analyses. Since wages
in the Netherlands still differ considerably between men and women, we did
these estimations separately for women and for men. The results3 indicate
that having a flexible job is financially unfavourable for men as well as for
women. In 1996 men in flexible jobs earned almost 14 percent less than men
with permanent labour contracts. The gross wage rate for women in flexible
jobs was about 12 percent less than for women with permanent employ-
ment. The gross wage rate for part-time jobs was no less than that for full-time
jobs. This was the case for both male and female employees. This finding under-
lines the point made earlier that in the Netherlands working in a part-time job
is quite different from having a temporary or some other form of flexible
contract.
7 Conclusions and discussion
The numbers of employees in flexible labour relationships are slowly increasing
in the Netherlands. Our analysis revealed two important factors for predicting
whether people will be employed in flexible or permanent labour relationships:
earlier labour market position and the length of training period of the job in
which people are employed. Having a job earlier gives a better chance of get-
ting a permanent job now, than having no job or being unemployed. So, labour
market experience matters. The length of the training period of a job also refers
to the importance of human capital: workers with a great deal of company-
specific, human capital constitute the core of an organization’s staff. They are
offered permanent jobs, including all the accompanying benefits, both material
and immaterial.
Men have permanent contracts significantly more often than women.
However, once in the labour market women and men on temporary contracts
stand equal chances of winning permanent contracts. On the whole, it turns out
that there are many workers with flexible contracts, relatively speaking, who
obtain permanent contracts within two years. The likelihood of realizing such
a transition has, however, been deteriorating slightly during the last decade.
Still, the majority of working people are employed in permanent contracts and
our analyses do not show any evidence of an emerging dichotomy between tem-
porary and permanent workers in the labour market. So, referring to the title
of this article: labour market flexibility has been introduced in the Netherlands
without generating real ‘losers’.
This does not imply, however, that there are no ‘losses’ to be reported:
workers with permanent contracts do – other things being equal – earn more
than flexible workers, though the difference seems to have been diminishing
during the last decade. This means that flexible jobs do not offer financial com-
pensations for their disadvantages. On the contrary, besides insecurity, which
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can be considered as a cost, being employed in flexible relationships generates
other costs as well in terms of lower income.
More and more, Dutch government policies and collective agreements
between unions and employers’ organizations aim at mitigating the negative
consequences of flexible contracts. More legal protection for flexible workers
has been realized by recent legislation. The aim of Dutch labour market policy,
however, is not just to provide protection. There is also a reverse trend in the
liberalization of dismissal rules. In general, the Dutch government and Dutch
employers are trying to make the labour market more flexible. Does this mean
that the heyday of permanent contracts is over in the Netherlands and that soon
nearly all workers will be employed in flexible contracts? The answer appears
to be a simple no. Workers still look for security in their jobs and predictabil-
ity in their lives, and this will not change overnight. In addition to this, the fact
that we are experiencing a booming economy also helps. In many sectors of the
Dutch labour market, there is a shortage of qualified workers.4 In such a situa-
tion, workers have a strong bargaining position with regard to employment
conditions. Employers try hard to keep qualified workers on board.
This underlines the fact that the balanced way in which flexibility was
introduced into the Dutch labour market has been supported by rather
favourable circumstances: continuous growth of the economy and increasing
labour market shortages. The test is, of course, how flexible workers will fare
in the event of adverse economic conditions. Moreover, the inflow of more
(illegal) immigrant workers, such as those working in bulb cultivation or in the
catering industry, constitutes a flexible labour market segment that is not
included in official statistics. Newspaper stories and case-study research, how-
ever, tell us that working conditions in this segment are poor and that much of
the protection of the official flexible labour market segment is lacking here. This
means that continuous attention is required regarding the development of
labour market flexibility, both by policy makers and by researchers.
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Notes
1 In the survey, respondents were asked in which country they were born. They
could chose from a limited number of categories: the Netherlands, Surinam, the
Netherlands Antilles, Turkey, Morocco or elsewhere. Hardly any respondents
chose the last category. Ethnicity is included in the analyses as a dummy vari-
able: 1 = born outside the Netherlands.
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2 Unfortunately there are no systematic data available on workers’ labour mar-
ket positions and types of contracts in their first job. However, based on our
data we were able to select those respondents ‘currently’ with a job but who
were either unemployed, a student or in the army two years earlier. The per-
centage of men with a permanent contract in this group proved to be higher
than that of women (67 versus 55%).
3 The analyses are available from the authors upon request. Due to differences in
the way wage rates were measured between the waves of the panel, it was not
possible to use pooled data for this analysis.
4 Also after September 11, 2001 many organizations still report serious labour
market shortages. Many employers expect these shortages to last throughout
the next few years. 
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